This paper begins a part of the course in which we will discuss issues concerning consciousness, and Jackson will consider what is often seen as the most central aspect of it. The term qualia in the title is the plural of the noun quale; this word can simply mean ‘quality’, but, in this context, it refers to the felt or phenomenal qualities that reflect “what it’s like” to have an experience.
Jackson considers three arguments for qualia and then argues that it is possible to regard qualia as epiphenomena (hence the title).
• The “knowledge argument” of §1 is associated with Jackson and is very well known. Pay attention to the second of Jackson’s examples (concerning the neurophysiologist Mary). Although he presents it here more briefly than the first, it has become the standard way of approaching the knowledge argument.
• Jackson considers two further arguments in §§2-3, mainly, it seems, to argue that his is better—or, at least, that it is not subject to the same objections. However, both of these other arguments are well known.
• Jackson considers the “modal argument” in §2 only briefly, and it may seem lackluster; but people began to call the sort of creatures he describes in the first paragraph “zombies,” and the argument has acquired the snazzier label “zombie argument.” (On the other hand, if you are taken by that label, you should remember that it is a technical term, and these philosophical zombies don’t necessarily have the same properties as the ones in pop culture.)
• The paper Jackson mentions in §3 is also well known and was an early source of revived philosophical interest in issues of consciousness. As Jackson remarks in a footnote, the paper isn’t easily reduced to an argument, but the argument he distills from it is worth considering.
• You’ve run into the term “epiphenomalism” before, but no one we’ve discussed so far has had a lot to say about the idea. And, although Jackson is considering a fairly special example of epiphenomena in §4, he addresses issues that would arise in other cases, too.