Gordon’s is the first of a pair of papers we will discuss that outline two sides of a dispute regarding the nature of folk psychology, or what is often now called “theory of mind.” Is it, as Churchland and Dennett suggest (in somewhat different ways), a common-sense alternative to a scientific theory? Or is a product of using our ability to make decisions for ourselves—using practical reasoning (i.e., reasoning leading to action or praxis)—to predict the actions of others? The latter view, Gordon’s, is a “simulation theory” about the nature of our theory of mind while the former view has come to be called the “theory theory.”

Although Gordon will note the philosophical sources of the theory theory and cite psychological evidence for his view, this is not a dispute between philosophers and psychologists. Gordon’s own background is in philosophy, and the theory theory is widely held by psychologists. Indeed, the use of the phrase “theory of mind” indicates this since the term is somewhat misleading if simulation theory is correct.

Gordon’s paper is clearly structured, so I won’t try to guide your reading beyond noting that, while his introductory remarks could suggest that the final section is supplementary, it is the central one for our purposes. Indeed, you could regard the account of belief ascription offered at the end of p. 374 as the climax of the paper.