This is probably one of the more difficult pieces you will read this semester. Davidson presupposes acquaintance with more ideas than I can prepare you for in this guide. But he also provides enough alternative ways of making his points that I can suggest ways around the worst patches.
• The introductory section is quite clear and can be something to hang on to if you find yourself wondering where he is headed.
• Section I builds to its last paragraph, which provides the promised reconciliation of the three principles of the introduction.
Along the way, Davidson first characterizes the mental in a way that may be somewhat mysterious (p. 57, c. 1). Note, however, his reference to Brentano’s characterization (in terms of “intentional inexistence,” the ability to think things that don’t exist) on p. 57, c. 2.
One idea from the discussion p. 57, c. 1, will continue to reappear—that the mental is “non-extensional” and that “the usual laws of substitution break down—so I’ll say something about it. Brentano’s idea is that hope for is mental because someone might hope for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand even if it never occurs. Davidson sees this as closely related to the fact that someone can hope to meet the author of Waverly but not hope to meet his disagreeable neighbor even though his neighbor is in fact the author of Waverly. “Non-extensionality” occurs when you cannot substitute one expression for another even though they refer to the same thing (or to the same class of things). In such cases, the thing (or class of things) cannot be considered merely “in extension” but rather “under a description”—i.e., as described in a certain way.
The second key idea of the section is that the identity theory need not propose an identity between kinds or laws correlating kinds. This leads to the idea of monism without laws—i.e., “anomalous monism” as distinct from “nomological monism.”
(I’ll say something in class about the discussion of truth on p. 59, c. 1, but I can’t fit in anything very helpful here.)
• In the case of section II, I’ll suggest a circuitous route.
• Begin on p. 61, c. 1, with “In our daily traffic …” and continue up to the discussion of measurement at the bottom of c. 2.
• Pick of the reading again in the midst of the paragraph at the bottom of p. 62, c. 1, at “Concepts such as that of length …” and continue to the end of the section.
• Then return to the beginning of the section and read the discussion of “lawlikeness,” which runs through p. 61, c. 1, up to the point where I suggested you begin. (The terms “counterfactual” and “subjunctive” refer to a kind of conditional statement closely associated with laws—e.g., “if this sugar were in that water, it would be dissolving.” Such statements often have if-clauses that are known to be false (hence “counterfactual”) and are often stated using verb forms that are labeled “subjunctive.” (The sort of recombination of words Davidson plays with on pp. 60-61 was introduced as part of an argument, by Nelson Goodman, that only “projectable” predicates, which don’t include the likes of ‘grue’, could figure in generalizations that were supported by evidence.)
• The new content of third section—Davidson’s argument for monism in the first paragraph of p. 64—is less central than the previous sections; but it is also shorter with fewer allusions to technical discussions, and it functions in part as an occasion for him to sum things up.