• Death speaks (323-324). Think about the distinction between realism and interpretationism about belief. Dennett has more to say about it later, and the issue will show up in “Real Patterns,” too. The end of the section gives a nice brief description of the intentional stance and strategy and an intentional system, ideas that will be elaborated later.

• The Intentional Strategy and How it Works (324-328). Dennett approaches intentionality here by a series of corresponding stances, strategies, and systems: astrological, physical, design, and finally intentional. Get clear about both what they have in common and how they differ. He elaborates the last by considering in turn principles for attributing beliefs, desires, and rationality; be sure to locate the ones he states explicitly and think a bit about each. Finally, thinking through the series of examples of the intentional strategy Dennett concludes with (327-328) will loosen you up for the discussion to follow, where the example of thermostat will play an especially prominent role.

• True Believers as Intentional Systems (328-333). The first part of this section (328-330) is centered on two examples—what distinguishes the case of the lectern from our own case (even when we consider Laplacean Martians)? On p. 331, Dennett states his own position about realism regarding belief; he will elaborate this further in “Real Patterns.” The remainder of the section (332-333) concerns the idea of internal representations. Think about what distinguishes internal representations from other internal states according to Dennett, but think also about the “fastening” of the thermostat’s beliefs (332, c. 2) and Dennett's use of the example of Twin Earth; we will run into these issues and the latter example again later in the course.

Assignment for Tues. 10/25

• Why Does the Intentional Strategy Work? (333-334) Follow the steps from quick answers to the why-question, to a behaviorist answer to the how-question, and finally to a still fuller answer.

• §1 (351-353). Dennett’s introduction makes it clear that this is a sort of reply to critics of the view he expressed in “True Believers.” By the end, he will locate his view within a range of possibilities (most of whose other options are attached to people you have read). He will later refer to this range as one from realism to “instrumentalism” (a term applied to the claim that something—a center of gravity, for example—is merely a “useful fiction”). (The reference to “Gibsonians” just above this is to people sympathetic with the views of the psychologist James Gibson—in particular, with a view of perception that emphasized the information available “in the light” that reaches the eye—and the reference to “Quineans” is to people sympathetic to the views of W. V. Quine, who Dennett will say more about later.)

• §2 (353-356). This section is devoted to a careful look at patterns, initially visual ones but eventually a broader range.

• §3 (356-359). This has more on patterns, this time patterns in motion that Dennett begins to describe in terms reflecting some of the “stances” set out “True Believers.” Much of the discussion uses Conway’s “Game of Life” as an example. Dennett tells you all you need to know about this; but, if you are interested in seeing it live, you can find an implementation that will run in a web browser at http://www.ibiblio.org/lifepatterns/.

Assignment for Thurs. 10/27

• §4 (359-364). The last section is the real heart of Dennett’s argument. In it, he sets out his reasons for occupying the position he does on the continuum of views from Fodor to Churchland.