There is little hard evidence about the philosophical views of the historical Socrates. Many of views expressed by the character Socrates in Plato’s dialogues seem pretty clearly to be Plato’s own; but, when people do speculate that certain of these views are reflections of things the historical Socrates said, two related positions that can be found in this group of selections are frequently suggested. Much of what Socrates argues in the selections from the Gorgias points to the view that (i) no one knowingly does wrong, and the main focus of the selections from the Protagoras is a view—often labeled “the unity of the virtues”—according to which (ii) good character traits are all essentially the same.

Both Gorgias and Protagoras were historical figures (as were others whose names appear in these selections). Gorgias and Protagoras were prominent “sophists,” a loosely defined group of private teachers who offered to make their pupils better (and more successful) citizens and thus could be seen to offer wisdom (sophos in Greek). Socrates could be compared with them and many of his contemporaries probably thought of him as a sort of sophist (though he did not offer wisdom for pay), but he may have seen his aims as different from theirs. At any rate, Plato was concerned to distinguish Socrates from the sophists, and that interest appears repeatedly in these dialogues and to some extent in the selections I’ve assigned, but the relation of the positions (i) and (ii) to question of Socrates’ relation to the sophists is at best indirect.

As I’ve stated them above, both of the positions (i) and (ii) are at least surprising and perhaps paradoxical, so it may be that Plato, or his character Socrates, really had something more moderate in mind than the statements might suggest. But for our purposes, it’s probably best to think of these positions in the strongest form you can (Aristotle will offer more moderate versions of both) since that provides a way of thinking just how far reason can take us in ethics. Socrates suggests that Euthyphro could be criticized for not really understanding what he is doing. In its strongest form, position (i) could suggest that failures of understanding are not merely a sort of moral failure but the only sort of moral failure there is. And position (ii) expresses one consequence of supposing not merely that a degree of wisdom is required in order have a good character but that wisdom is all there is to having good character.

As you read these selections look for the sorts reasons someone might have for holding the positions (i) and (ii) and ask yourself how far those reasons would justify such positions in the very strong form I’ve just suggested.