| Phi 110 Fall 2015 |
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Plato’s Euthyphro is one of a number of dialogues that seem designed, in part, to depict the sort of conversations the historical Socrates may have had. And, since he wrote nothing, conversation formed the whole of his philosophical activity.
Although many of the characters in Plato’s dialogues were real people, there is no evidence that this is true of Euthyphro; and, in any case, there is no reason to think the dialogue reports or reconstructs an actual conversation. Nonetheless, there are two features of the historical context that are worth bearing in mind. First, any killing had a religious significance greater than that of other ethical issues. In particular, someone who killed another, even through a blameless accident, was religiously “polluted” and was in need of purification. Second, prosecution in the Athenian legal system was always private prosecution; even clear cases of murder would not be prosecuted unless a private individual brought a case.
I’ll suggest three things to think about as you read the dialogue:
• Euthyphro’s case is an interesting one and worth discussing in its own right. In thinking what you have to say about it, it’s probably best to set aside the issue of the proper handling of religious pollution, so the question is not whether Euthyphro’s action is pious but whether it is morally right. And our main interest in this question will not be whether the action is or isn’t right but what sort of reasons might be given on one side or the other.
• Also, think about Socrates’ insistence that Euthyphro be able to justify his actions in light of a coherent general account of piety. Is that sort of justification required for an action to be right? If not, is it required if the agent (i.e., the person who performed the action) is to be a good person? And, if not that, is having such a justification required for anything of value?
• Finally, think about the question about piety and the gods’ love that Socrates poses at 10a. It is one example of a general sort of question about the source of morality: at the most fundamental level is it traceable to some sort of attitude (e.g., love) or to a command or is it traceable to some sort of property (e.g., piety) that forms the basis for attitudes or commands?