My project will explain why levels of Jewish victimization varied among Nazi-occupied countries during World War Two. I will show that the ‘success’ of the German genocide program depended most importantly upon the relationship between Germany and each occupied country. In each country it occupied, Germany faced a choice as to how it was to administer the newly acquired territory. In some cases (like Poland and Bohemia-Moravia), Germany occupied and ruled the territory directly. In others (Vichy France), Germany ruled through collaborators. I argue that where German rule was direct, its implementation of the Final Solution was unhindered, and therefore more effective. On the other hand, where Germany ruled through collaborators, the precise implementation of genocidal policies was the result of complex bargaining and negotiations: In return for their loyal cooperation in military or economic policy, collaborators could often get away with partial or simply ‘unenthusiastic’ implementation of the Final Solution. This was often a major factor in reducing rates of Jewish victimization.

As part of this project, I will investigate the incentives that existed for collaborationist regimes to negotiate on behalf of local Jews — as well as the German incentives to accept their terms. With regard to the latter, Nazi Germany clearly found indirect rule to be beneficial in a number of respects. Usually, what Germany lost in terms of inefficiency and compromise, it gained in terms of lower governance costs. Thus, so long as collaborationist regimes could be trusted not to sabotage the German war effort, Germany was happy to let its ‘Quislings’ take on the responsibilities of fighting partisans or enforcing local law. Indeed, with locals at the helm, local administration retained at least the pretense of legitimacy, something that was nearly impossible where Germany ruled directly.

But German occupation was not an unmitigated evil for most collaborators, either. Aside from the obvious fact that their positions in office were often bolstered by Nazi persecution of the opposition (socialists, leftists, trade unions, etc.), occupied countries could often reap the economic rewards of trade with the Third Reich. In the meantime, military cooperation with Germany often held out the promise of territorial expansion at the expense of one’s neighbors — as it did for Finland and Romania in Russia, and Bulgaria in Yugoslavia and Greece. Lured by these economic, military and political rewards of cooperation, and responding to their own domestic concerns, collaborators often had the incentive to ‘strike deals’ with Nazi officials.

But why would collaborators use their resulting autonomy to protect local Jews? Certainly, genuine concern for the well-being of Jews, or reflection upon the sheer horror of the Nazi program, was sometimes a relevant factor. But there’s something unsatisfying about attributing moral motives to people who cooperated with the Nazis! Thus, my project seeks to elucidate the ‘more ordinary’ motives of collaborationist regimes, and to show how protecting Jews was often in their best interest, narrowly defined. After all, collaborators who deported Jews gave up a potentially-profitable opportunity to exploit them. Jews who otherwise faced deportation at the hands of the Nazis were fertile targets for political or even financial blackmail. Sometimes, collaborators protected Jews because Jews were part of key political constituencies. And sometimes, Jews even bribed local officials for protection from Nazi persecution.

This project will be a significant contribution, not only to our study of the Holocaust, but to our understanding of antisemitism, ethnic hatred, and imperialism generally. First, it is one of the few broadly comparative studies of the Nazi genocide, and the only one from the perspective of political science. It is also the only study that pays such close attention to the incentives facing major actors in this important event. But standing at the interface of two enduring global phenomena – imperialism and ethnic animosity – this project also adds light to several important debates in social and political science generally. By showing that antisemitism was only indirectly related to Jewish victimization, we learn to question the centrality of ‘ancient hatreds’ in modern instantiations of ethnic violence. And by studying the implementation of a common policy throughout a vast empire, we learn more about the relationship between regional hegemons and the states (or subject-states) they try to influence.