

Final Paper Prospectus
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Not to kick a dead horse, but I will also be focusing on Leibniz's view of free will. Since the first couple of classes, I have been conflicted that in one hand Leibniz says that God has knowledge of all that has occurred, is occurring, and will occur, and in the other say that free will is inherent in the individuals. For if God did create this world, and it is the poisonous term Best Possible World, and has knowledge of all proceedings within this world, then he would in essence had created a world without any form of free choice or will. Leibniz rejects this idea however, and of free will says, "It is here, then, that we must apply the distinction concerning connections, and I say that whatever happens in conformity with these predeterminations is certain but not necessary, and if one were to do the contrary, he would not be doing something impossible in itself, even though it would be impossible for this to happen." (AG 45) This is a deeply conflicting and confusing passage. To Leibniz, future contingents are certain, but not necessary. So where is the free will?

In my paper, I am going to focus primarily on the use of the terms certainty and necessary in describing God's involvement in individual's choices, and the implications of those terms. I do not think that it is possible for one's actions to be both independently decided by the individual, and also contingent on the knowledge and understanding of God. My goal is to arrive at the conclusion that what Leibniz is speaking about is purely predestination in individuals, and not free will. I assume that at this point, I might have to come up with my own definition of free will, but if it is at all possible, I would like to steer as far away as possible from that. Primarily, I will be focusing on Leibniz's

Discourse on Metaphysics and Blumenfeld's "Freedom, Contingency, and Things Possible in Themselves".