Russell’s discussion in “The Monistic Theory Of Truth” is divided into two sections (the first two sections of the original paper, whose final section he dropped and replaced by a new essay when he published the collection this is drawn from). I’ve suggested you read also a short selection from The Problems of Philosophy, which he published two years later. That selection supplements the arguments in section I of “The Monistic Theory,” so you might read it between the two sections of that paper, and the notes below are in that order.
• The first section is Russell’s argument against the Joachim’s theory of truth as such. His references are to Joachim’s book, The Nature of Truth, but the content of that is close enough to the paper you read that I should be clear what views Russell has in mind. (Still, if you’d like to follow out his references, Joachim’s book is included in the text browser on the course Moodle site.) You will find that Russell offers a helpful summary of his arguments at the end of the section.
• Ch. 12 of The Problems of Philosophy is mainly devoted to the ideas we will encounter in the last paper in his Philosophical Essays. But he begins the chapter with a short critique of theories of truth like Joachim’s. This is of interest because the arguments are a little different (they overlap the last of his four arguments in the earlier paper) and represent standard lines of argument against any sort of coherence theory. (If you’re curious, you can find the rest of the chapter, and of the book, in the text browser.)
• The final section addresses what Russell saw as the chief difference between him and the British Idealists, the idea of “internal relations.” This appears in Joachim most clearly in his discussions (on pp. 4-6) of what is required for knowledge to be systematic.