This paper was one of Alvin Goldman’s first publications on any subject, and his views on epistemology have developed considerably since, but they still share with the account of knowledge offered here a focus on the processes that lead to belief. The paper was timely, not only as one of the early attempts to deal with the Gettier problem but also as one of the first of a wave of “causal” theories concerning various issues in philosophy.
There are eight unlabeled sections.
• The first section (pp. 357f) is an introduction in which Goldman sketches the Gettier problem and his approach to solving it. In the next (pp. 358-360), he illustrates this idea in the cases of knowledge deriving from perception and memory.
• The central four sections lead up to Goldman's proposed definition on knowledge (on p. 369). Goldman does two sorts of things in them.
• In the third and fifth (pp. 360-363, 364-366), he presents (in diagrams) two patterns he sees exhibited in the processes leading to knowledge.
• The fourth and sixth (pp. 363f, 366-368) are comparisons of his approach to the Gettier problem with Clark’s. Notice the similarities he sees—i.e., the defense he offers of Clark—as well as the differences.
• In the seventh section, Goldman’s definition follows a brief discussion of the way causal connections are extended to beliefs that are “logically related” to the beliefs figuring most directly in these connections. And it is followed in turn by brief discussions of several further issues. Notice especially the first of these (discussed on p. 370), the question whether we must be able to state justifications of our beliefs for them to be knowledge. Finally, in his concluding section (pp. 371f), Goldman comments on what he takes to be the significance of the definition he has offered.
You should try to complete the paper for Tuesday, but our discussion of it is likely to continue on Thursday, when we will also consider a few sections from a later paper that represents an important further development of Goldman’s views.