There are too many ideas here for us to cover them all. The notes below divide the remarks into two large groups. The most important of the ideas in this part of the Investigations occur near the beginning of the first group (around §§66-74) and near the end of the second (around §§109-133).

The first remarks in this assignment concern issues relevant to a picture of language found in Wittgenstein’s writings from the early 1930s—according to which definitions and rules of language are the source of meaning. This is the picture reflected in most of Moore’s reports of Wittgenstein’s lectures, especially in the first part of section A (Klemke, pp. 256-259); and it also was very close to the views of logical positivists like Ayer.

• §65. The general form of propositions. The Tractatus can be read as an attempt to counter mistaken answers to the question of what is essential to language. In the Investigations Wittgenstein goes further and rejects the question.

• §§66-74. Definitions and rules. In one of the earliest places where Wittgenstein addresses these issues he explicitly contrasts his view with Socrates’ demands for definitions; the issues are also related to the discussions of general ideas in Berkeley and Hume. What is the significance of the metaphor of “family resemblance”? Does this provide a better way of saying what all instances of a concept have in common? What is the difference between a concept which is rigidly defined and one which isn’t? What is the importance of the idea of seeing what is common? Think about both the attitude Wittgenstein takes to this idea and the way he tries to help a reader see things his way.

• §§75-81. Knowledge of meaning without definitions and rules. Just what do we know when we understand a concept or know the meaning of a word? Are we ready to answer all questions about its application? It may be helpful to bear in mind the two figures Wittgenstein supplies: concepts with blurred edges and concepts with holes (see §99). Wittgenstein’s example of Moses in §79 concerns issues of the meaning of proper names addressed by Russell and Kripke. Ask yourself to what extent Wittgenstein seems to be agreeing or disagreeing with Russell’s views about ordinary proper names. Wittgenstein says (in §81) that the “normative” character of logic should be understood in terms of constructed standards for comparison rather than ideals which are approximated—what does this have to do with the difference between philosophy and natural science?

• §§82-88. Meaningful activity and rules. Think of Wittgenstein’s examples of the variety of ways our actions can be referred to rules and try to imagine some further ones. What is it like to have an activity that is everywhere bounded by rules? And how do we apply the concept of exactness? Notice that Wittgenstein’s answers to these questions take the form of examples; at this point, you might look ahead to §127 and speculate about the purpose of this particular group of reminders.

Most of the remaining remarks (§§89-133) concern the nature of philosophy, first critically and then in a more positive way. Compare these to the views you’ve seen in Russell and the logical positivists and to your own views. §§134-137 are both a return to the topic introduced in §65 and a transition to the remarks we will discuss next week.

• §§89-97. The sublimation of logic. Notice how (in earlier sections of this group) the desire to understand something in plain view (rather than learn anything new) leads to a search for a hidden essence. Wittgenstein says (§93) that propositions seem remarkable, in part, because we misunderstand what they do; compare this to what he says about the mental in §36. This discussion grows into the reference to “super-concepts” in §97—what is the contrast between these and “humble” uses of words?

• §§98-108. Preconceived purity. What leads us to feel that “there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence” (§98)? How does this represent a misunderstanding of “the role of the ideal in our language”(§100)? What would it be to rotate “the axis of reference of our investigation” around “the fixed point of our real need” (§108)? Also try to fit in the metaphors—e.g., the glasses we don’t think to remove (§103), repairing a spider’s web (§106), and walking on ice (§107).

• §§109-121. The battle against bewitchment. Why does explanation need to be overthrown in favor of description?—and how does description serve philosophy? Where is the depth and value of philosophy to be found (if not in explanation)? Compare the discussion of frame-tracing in §§113-115 with the final paragraph of §38 and try to fit it into the account of philosophical error implicit in §§26-38. What would “second-order philosophy” (§121) be and what is wrong with the idea?

• §§122-133. Perspicuous representation by assembling reminders. Why are philosophical problems problems of disorientation (§123)?—and how should we deal with them? Why is the hidden of no interest in philosophy (§126)?—and why would philosophical theses be undebatable (§128)?

• §§134-137. The meaning that fits. In what sense should we not say that “true” and “false” fit propositions—and in what sense might we say it? What is the difference between these two senses? It might help to reflect on the corresponding metaphors of a cogwheel (§136) and the alphabet (§137). A glance at §138 will show how this topic leads to the following remarks (in which the idea of meaning as use is reconciled with our inclination to say we grasp meaning in a flash).