These two groups of remarks come about as close as Wittgenstein does in the Investigations to the traditional questions of the nature of truth and knowledge; but, throughout, his focus is also on views of meaning.

• §§428-465. Thought and reality. In this part of the Investigations, Wittgenstein returns to issues associated with the picture theory of meaning of the Tractatus and with the idea of a “shadow” that Moore reports him discussing in the early 1930s (see Klemke, pp. 262-263). The following are characteristic remarks: §§435, 442, 444-445, and 448. (Garth Hallett translates the Latin in §436 as “They are perfectly obvious and ordinary, and yet the same things are too well hidden, and their discovery comes as something new.”)

• §§466-497. Language as an instrument. In a number of places, Wittgenstein suggests we compare words and sentences to tools (see, for example, §§23, 360, and 421), and this might suggest that we should understand language as an instrument designed to serve a purpose. In the latter part of this group of remarks, Wittgenstein rejects the idea of language as an instrument, but he begins with a discussion of the justification of empirical knowledge. Think about §§467, 480, 483, 492, 496-497.