In these remarks, Wittgenstein can be seen to address an objection to the idea that meaning is use. The objection comes at the very beginning and leads to an extended consideration of the grounds on which we ascribe understanding to ourselves and others—i.e., to an investigation of our use of the concept of understanding.

• §§138-142. What comes before the mind vs. its application. What is the conflict between the idea of meaning as use and our ability to grasp meaning in a flash? In what sense can the application of a word come before the mind and in what sense can’t it?

• §§143-155. Understanding a series. Throughout his work, Wittgenstein used an ability to continue a series as a metaphor or model for our understanding of language. In both cases we seem to acquire a finite amount of knowledge that enables us to go on indefinitely. The burden of this section is to explore the significance of claims that a series is understood and to dispel misinterpretations of the grammar of such claims. See especially §§144, 147, 149, 153, 155.

• §§156-171. The example of reading. Reading (as a “reading machine” who recites but needn’t understand) serves as another simplified model of our grasp of language. Notice especially Wittgenstein’s efforts to undercut any attempt to reduce the ability of such a reader to a concurrent mental event or process—and look most closely at §§157, 158, 164.

• §§172-178. The experience of being guided. In this group of remarks, Wittgenstein addresses the same issues as the example of reading (see §§156-171) in a more general setting—focus on §§173 and 177.

• §§179-184. “Now I can go on.” This returns us to the issue set out in §§138-142. Focus on §§179, 180, 183.