• Frege operated with a somewhat different scheme of concepts than would be found in mature analytic philosophy (e.g., in Carnap). First, although he is responsible for the rejection of Kant’s claim that arithmetic is synthetic, he did hold that geometry was synthetic and thus accepted the existence of some synthetic a priori truths. Second, he had a concept of meaning, usually translated as “sense” that made finer distinctions than does any idea of synonymy tied to analyticity: when two expressions have the same sense, anyone who understands both should be able to see that immediately while analytic equivalence can require proofs that are far from obvious. Putting the two points together, a priori equivalence, analytic equivalence, and equivalence in sense would make successively finer distinctions among expressions.

• That Dummett finds something like Frege’s view of sense in Quine should be a little surprising. It depends on Dummett’s own understanding of the significance of Quine’s metaphor of a “field of force” in the last section of “Two Dogmas.” He takes relative distance from the experiential periphery (and nearness to differing parts of that periphery) to be a central feature of that metaphor and sees it as supporting the idea of ties to experience that differ from sentence to sentence (contrary to Quine’s claim earlier in the paper that no empirical significance could be assigned to sentences individually).