Although Wittgenstein’s style has clearly changed significantly from the Tractatus—and many would argue that his fundamental convictions have changed as well—this material shows that he is interested in many of the same issues.
Pp. 20-22 (“What happens if ...”-“...having been satisfied.”): expectation. These are preliminary remarks which set up the extended discussion of expectation and related “intentional attitudes” that forms the rest of this assignment. In this initial discussion, notice the two sorts of connections with sensation we might try to make and the limitations of each.
Pp. 30-41 (“A great many ...”-“... all the time.)”): the problem of intentionality. At bottom, Wittgenstein is addressing here the same issue as Russell tackles in his analysis of belief in ch. 12 of The Problems of Philosophy and that his own picture theory of meaning was designed to address. The notes below point you to some highlights but they do not exhaust the variety of points Wittgenstein makes in the course of this discussion.
• Wittgenstein’s reference to the Tractatus on p. 31 points to a possible motivation for the atomism that his picture theory shared with Russell’s account of judgment.
• His references to the idea of “a shadow of the fact” on p. 32 can be compared to Russell’s doubts about “objective falsehoods.”
• His criticisms of the idea that intention could be traced to mental processes (on pp. 32-34) uses techniques similar to his criticisms of mental images as meanings (pp. 3-4). Also notice his doubts about the idea of a “last interpretation” (p. 34).
• The further discussion of the “shadow” and related ideas on pp. 35ff culminates in the two central paragraphs of p. 37. Why does the “shadow” have no point? What does he think we would really like to say?
• Notice the several suggestions on pp. 38f of the real way a connection is made between our thought and its objects—and also the suggestion (on p. 39) that a reference to the mental is a cover for our misunderstanding of this.
• The figure of the string of pearls (on pp. 39f) is important. It is relevant to Wittgenstein’s discussions both of intentionality and of generality and rules. The latter connection is made more explicit in the parenthetical discussion of trisection at the end of this assignment (on p. 41).