Below are groupings of language games in the second half of part I of The Brown Book following the same format and Tuesday’s guide. Its worth bearing in mind the idea of an ability even in cases where that is not an explicit topic.

44-46: “can” used to describe states of objects
The concept of possibility raises many of the same issues as intentionality. Here Wittgenstein begins to explore ways in which talk of possibilities can be like or unlike talk of an object’s properties.

47-48: abilities as qualities and grounds for their ascribing them
Wittgenstein’s commentary following these passages doesn’t address them directly but is important nonetheless. The idea of “natural expressions of emotion” is one he uses also in his in discussions of the ascription of mental states to others.

49: using “has” and “can” on the basis of the same fact
Notice that the two sorts of expression exhibited in this game are verified in the same way though in other respects they play different roles in the language.

50-53: historical narration
Wittgenstein’s comments on these games suggest you might think of them in connection with Augustine’s puzzle about time that he mentioned in The Blue Book (p. 26).

54-55: telling time
One might parody the opening of The Blue Book here, saying that, if you want to answer the question of what time is, consider the question of how we tell time.

56-61: prediction of the future and “can” as a conjecture
Game 56 introduces a long commentary of its own but in the shorter one after game 61 (p. 112) Wittgenstein explains how these examples are connected with his interest in abilities.

62-66: ascribing an ability
The extended commentaries following games 64 and 66 are indications that these examples get at the heart of Wittgenstein’s interests here. I already noted concerning The Blue Book that the ability to continue a mathematical series often serves him as a surrogate for the ability to use a language. And the phrase “Now I can go on” receives extended attention in his Philosophical Investigations. There he explicitly treats this phrase as a potential challenge to his claim that the meaningfulness does not lie in an accompanying mental process because “Now I can go on” can seem to both report a mental event and assert a grasp of meaning.

67-69: reading machines
Wittgenstein here returns to topics from the end of last time’s assignment. “Reading machines” provide a simple model for cases of rule-following where we are “guided” by something. Watch for places where he touches on the issue of whether being guided consists in the existence of a certain mental process.

70-73: deriving
Although these games enrich his set of examples a little further, our chief interest will be in the comments on philosophical method at the end.