Putnam asks whether meanings are “in the head” and answers that they are not. More specifically, what he has to say about meaning and reference is that what we know of the meaning of a term will often be insufficient to determine what it refers to. Kripke said something like this about proper names and suggested that natural-kind terms were similar. Putnam focuses on the latter and considers a range of examples different in character from Kripke’s.

As Putnam notes in his last paragraph, he sees two reasons why meanings aren’t in the head. After his introductory section (Klemke 418-419), he considers a series of examples that illustrate one or both of these features of meaning (Klemke 419-422). He then devotes a section each to discussing these two features, first what he calls “the division of linguistic labor” (Klemke 422-423) and then what he calls “indexicality” (Klemke 423-427). He gives more attention to the latter point; and it is what he says about this, along with the associated examples concerning “Twin Earth,” that has been most influential and that will probably occupy most of our discussion.