J. L. Austin (1911-1960) was, like Wisdom, from the generation after Wittgenstein. John Searle (1932-) is from the next generation and was Austin’s student. Although Austin’s work provides some of the best examples of ordinary language philosophy, Searle’s paper is fairly early work and most of what he has done would probably not be classified as ordinary language philosophy.

Austin’s paper will be the focus of our discussion. It is presentation of ideas that were developed more fully in a series of lectures that were published after his death under the title How to Do Things with Words, and that title indicates one tie with Wittgenstein, a emphasis on the use of language. There are two central ideas to think about: (i) the variety of “speech acts” Austin points to and what he says in general about them and (ii) his distinctions among the ways declarative statements can fail. Both of these have become central to thinking about language; and, although other ordinary language philosophers—especially, P. F. Strawson (1919-2006) and H. P. Grice (1913-1988)—contributed significantly to thought about the latter topic, the former is directly attributable to Austin.

Searle’s paper will serve us in two ways. The first is as a more systematic presentation of some of Austin’s ideas. Sections I, III, and V (which can be read independently of the other two) outline a theory of speech acts and give a detailed account of the example of promising. Each of the remaining sections addresses another important idea, section II a distinction in the functions of rules and section IV a conception of meaning due to Grice. Although both are important for thinking about language, they are relatively independent of the idea of speech acts.