This part of Sellars’ paper can be seen to begin the heart of his discussion of “empiricism” (with the last several parts playing a comparable role for the “philosophy of mind”).

• In §10, notice that Sellars distinguishes acceptance of Myth of Given from the acceptance of inner episodes and sets out to consider examples of the former that don’t involve the latter.

• This leads him to discuss the relation of “X looks red to S at t” to “X is red” (§§11-12). As will become clear in the following sections, Sellars considers the latter idea to be in some sense prior to or more fundamental than the former; but then, he must account for the equivalence

x is red if and only if x would look red to standard observers in standard conditions

and §13 sketches the approach he will take in doing this.

• The heart of Sellars’s discussion of “looks”—and the heart of his discussion of empiricism—is the fable of John, the necktie salesman, §§14-15, so be sure to think about it, its moral, and its implications.

• Some of these implications appear in the discussion (in both of the sections 16) of differences among “S sees that X is green,” “X looks green to S,” and “X merely looks green to S.” Notice especially the connections between these expressions and the ideas of endorsing, withholding endorsement, and rejecting. This discussion is followed in §17 by a distinction between qualitative and existential looking that Sellars will refer to in §21.

• In §18, Sellars gives his promised account of the equivalence displayed in §12, and he explores the consequences of this for concept acquisition in §§19-20. These sections have connections (albeit negative ones) with Russell’s atomistic account of understanding, and the reference to Hegel may remind you the discussion of Hegelian views in Russell’s ch. 14. (Sellars will later refer us back to §19.)