Most of these remarks (§§89-133) concern the nature of philosophy, first critically and then in a more positive way; compare these to the views you've seen in Russell and the logical positivists and to your own views. §§134-137 are both a return to the topic introduced in §65 and a transition to the remarks that follow them.

§§89-97. The sublimation of logic. Notice how (in earlier sections of this group) the desire to understand something in plain view (rather than learn anything new) leads to a search for a hidden essence. Wittgenstein says (§93) that propositions seem remarkable, in part, because we misunderstand what they do; compare this to what he says about the mental in §36. This discussion grows into the reference to "super-concepts" in §97--what is the contrast between these and "humble" uses of words?

§§98-108. Preconceived purity. What leads us to feel that "there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence" (§98)? How does this represent a misunderstanding of "the role of the ideal in our language"(§100)? What would it be to rotate "the axis of reference of our investigation" around "the fixed point of our real need" (§108)? Also try to fit in the metaphors--e.g., the glasses we don't think to remove (§103), repairing a spider's web (§106), and walking on ice (§107).

§§109-121. The battle against bewitchment. Why does explanation need to be overthrown in favor of description?--and how does description serve philosophy? Where is the depth and value of philosophy to be found (if not in explanation)? Compare the discussion of frame-tracing in §§113-115 with the final paragraph of §38 and try to fit it into the account of philosophical error implicit in §§26-38. What would "second-order philosophy" (§121) be and what is wrong with the idea?

§§122-133. Perspicuous representation by assembling reminders. Why are philosophical problems problems of disorientation (§123)?--and how should we deal with them? Why is the hidden of no interest in philosophy (§126)?--and why would philosophical theses be undebatable (§128)?

§§134-137. The meaning that fits. In what sense should we not say that "true" and "false" fit propositions and in what sense might we say it? What is the difference between these two senses? It might help to reflect on the corresponding metaphors of a cogwheel (§136) and the alphabet (§137). A glance at §138 will show how this topic leads to the following sections (in which the idea of meaning as use is reconciled with our inclination to say we grasp meaning in a flash).