The first part of this assignment (§§39-64) addresses further ideas related to the Tractatus, specifically, the sort of analysis into logical atoms that was outlined in that work. The remaining sections concern issues relevant to a picture of language found in Wittgenstein's writings from the early 1930s--a picture not far from the one found in the logical positivists--according to which definitions and rules of language are the source of meaning.

We won't be able to confine our attention in class to certain groups of remarks. We will instead discuss specific remarks scattered through this assignment. Some are suggested below but you should note others that seem significant or puzzling.

§§39-45. Name, meaning, and bearer. We are led (like Russell) to regard "this" as the only genuine proper name because we have the idea that a name must signify something simple and thus indestructible so that meaningfulness won't depend on contingent facts (§39) and the term "this" is never without a bearer (§45). But we can describe the use and so see the meaningfulness of a name without a bearer (§41, §42). Notice the (near) definition of "meaning" in §43 and think about its connection with language games--if this is what meaning is, how do you explain the meaning of a word to someone?

§§46-58. Simples, samples, and indestructibility. Think of the quotation from Plato in §46 especially in connection with Russell's idea that names like "Bismarck" as disguised descriptions compounded of constituents with which we are acquainted. Then watch Wittgenstein set this philosophical picture against ordinary ideas of the simple and composite, of naming and description, and of samples. §54 is a preview of coming attractions. (Wittgenstein's comments on the standard meter in §50 will be recalled by Kripke.)

§§59-64. Complexes and the primacy of analysis. The pictures of language in Plato's Theaetetus, in Russell, and in the Tractatus are based on our ordinary ideas of parts and wholes (§59), but our ordinary talk of parts doesn't lie behind or explain our ordinary talk of wholes (§63).

§65. The general form of propositions. Wittgenstein's earlier Tractatus can be read as an attempt to counter mistaken answers to the question of what is essential to language. In the Investigations Wittgenstein goes further and rejects the question.

§§65-74. Definitions and rules. In one of the earliest places where Wittgenstein addresses these issues he explicitly contrasts his view with Socrates' demands for definitions; the issues are also related to the discussions of general ideas in Berkeley and Hume. What is the significance of the metaphor of "family resemblance"? Does this provide a better way of saying what all instances of a concept have in common? What is the difference between a concept which is rigidly defined and one which isn't? What is the importance of the idea of seeing what is common? Think about both the attitude Wittgenstein takes to this idea and the way he tries to help a reader see things his way.

§§75-81. Knowledge of meaning without definitions and rules. Just what do we know when we understand a concept or know the meaning of a word? Are we ready to answer all questions about its application? It may be helpful to bear in mind the two figures Wittgenstein supplies: concepts with blurred edges and concepts with holes (see §99). We will encounter Wittgenstein's example of Moses in §79 and the issues he raises discussing it when we read Kripke later in the course--for now, ask yourself to what extent Wittgenstein seems to be agreeing or disagreeing with Russell's views about ordinary proper names. Wittgenstein says (in §81) that the "normative" character of logic should be understood in terms of constructed standards for comparison rather than ideals which are approximated--what does this have to do with the difference between philosophy and natural science?

§§82-88. Meaningful activity and rules. Think of Wittgenstein's examples of the variety of ways our actions can be referred to rules and try to imagine some further ones. What is it like to have an activity that is everywhere bounded by rules? And how do we apply the concept of exactness? Notice that Wittgenstein's answers to these questions take the form of examples; look ahead to §127 and speculate about the purpose of this particular group of reminders.