These sections continue Wittgenstein's dissolution of the problem of other minds and come as close as any to specifying the attitude toward the mental that he has displayed throughout the book.

§§295-303. 3rd person ascriptions on the model of 1st person ascriptions. If we feel forced to think that we ascribe to others "something" which we find in ourselves, this is a picture that forces itself on us rather than a self-evident truth (§§295, 299). Indeed, it would not be easy to think of someone else's sensations on analogy with one's own, nor is there room for the doubt that would give such analogical reasoning its point (§§302, 303).

§§304-310. Only a picture is rejected. These remarks are not intended as a denial of mental states and processes, only of the picture of them as hidden counterparts to physical states and processes (§§304-305). The real problem lies in the assumption that they are two species of the same genus (§§308). Wittgenstein elsewhere says something comparable about finite and infinite quantities; he rejects the picture of them as two species of the genus number but also rejects attempts to reduce the infinite to finite signs for it and compares such attempts to behaviorism.

§§311-315. Private exhibition. The idea of a private exhibition of sensation is an illusion (§311). We can exhibit sensations only in the way we can exhibit anything else (§§312-313). And introspection is no way to solve philosophical problems (§314).