The first two groups of remarks in this assignment continue the discussion begun in the remarks for last time.
§§172-178. The experience of being guided. In this group of remarks, Wittgenstein addresses the same issues as the example of reading (see §§156-171) in a more general setting--focus on §§173 and 177.
§§179-184. "Now I can go on." This returns us to the issue set out in §§138-142. Focus on §§179, 180, 183.
It is standard to describe the topic of §§185-242 (which will continue through the rest of this assignment and all of the next one) as "rule-following." These remarks expand on the discussion of §§143-155, and the continuation of a series again often serves as a paradigm. But Wittgenstein's concern now is less to question the picture of a mental act or event of grasping the continuation of a series than it is to question a related picture, one of there being something present in us or to us which determines the correct continuation of the series. In a slightly earlier work, Wittgenstein responds to this as follows:
The fault which in all our reasoning about these matters we are inclined to make is to think that images and experiences of all sorts, which are in some sense closely connected with each other, must be present in our mind at the same time. If we sing a tune we know by heart, or say the alphabet, the notes or letters seem to hang together, and each seems to draw the next after it, as though they were a string of pearls in a box, and by pulling out one pearl I pulled out the one following it.
Now there is no doubt that, having the visual image of a string of beads being pulled out of a box through a hole in the lid, we should be inclined to say: "These beads must all have been together in the box before". But it is easy to see that this is making a hypothesis. I should have had the same image if the beads had gradually come into existence in the hole of the lid. We easily overlook the distinction between stating a conscious mental event, and making a hypothesis about what one might call the mechanism of the mind. All the more as such hypotheses or pictures of the working of our mind are embodied in many of the forms of expression of our everyday language. [The Blue Book, pp. 39f.]
§§185-188. The idea of an act of meaning. Since the initial steps of a series might be continued in an unexpected way (§185), what determines what the series was meant to be (§186)? The steps are not all considered individually (§187) so we are inclined to suppose that a special act of meaning determines them all (§188). Focus on §186; the idea of a new decision at every stage first appeared in Wittgenstein's thinking when he addressed the question of how mathematicians can be creative if mathematics consists solely of tautologies.
§§189-197. A machine as a symbol. We can be led to think that a formula for a series determines the steps in a way that is more direct than what is indicated by the normal use of the formula (e.g., our being trained so as to act in a regular way in applying it) (§§189-192). This is like regarding a machine as a symbol for its normal operation and supposing the basis for this symbol to lie in some shadowy feature of the machine (§§193-196). (You've seen remarks that recall Wittgenstein's stint as an elementary school teacher; these remind us that he was first trained as a mechanical engineer.) The real connection between a formula and the steps of a series in which it is applied is to be found in ordinary places--lists of rules, teaching, day-to-day practice (§197). Focus on §§191-192, 194 , and 197.
§§198-207. Rule-following as a practice. In general, we will speak of someone following a rule only in the context of a general practice of rule-following, a practice sustained by the common behavior of humanity. Focus on §§199, 202, 206. The second is preview of the topics for next time; think how it fits in here.