• Part VII. These sections are in keeping with Wittgenstein's suggestion that meaning be thought of as lying in the use of a sign and not thought of as a co-existing object, not even a mental one. Think, in particular, about the idea of a "role in a certain linguistic economy" that Sellars uses when speaking about the significance of statements of meaning. The key point of this discussion for Sellars's purposes lies in the last few lines of §31 (on p. 243).

• Part VIII through §34. In the latter part of VIII, Sellars will develop his own view of perceptual knowledge further. He prepares for that in these first few sections by considering a form of the Myth of the Given to which his own view is an alternative. This version of the myth is stated in §32 and discussed in §§33-34. The German term "Konstatierung" (which can be translated simply as "statement") was used as a technical term by the logical positivist Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), who was the senior member of the Vienna Circle. The role of such reports in Schlick's account of knowledge was roughly analogous to the role for Russell of truths of perception that are self-evident in his strongest sense (see The Problems of Philosophy ¶ 13.12).