In these sections, Sellars can be seen to discuss the morals to be drawn from the fable of the neck-tie salesman.

• Some of these morals appear in the discussion (in both of the sections 16) of differences among "S sees that X is green," "X looks green to S," and "X merely looks green to S." Notice especially the connections between these expressions and the ideas of endorsing, withholding endorsement, and rejecting. This discussion is followed in §17 by a distinction between qualitative and existential looking that Sellars will refer to in §21.

• In §18, Sellars gives his promised account of the equivalence displayed in §12, and he explores the consequences of this for concept acquisition in §§19-20. These sections have connections (albeit negative ones) with Russell's atomistic account of understanding, and the reference to Hegel may remind you the discussion of Hegelian views in Russell's ch. XIV. (Sellars will later refer us back to §19.)

• Part IV. After an introductory section, Sellars considers essentially two ways immediate experiences might be employed as explanations of qualitative and existential lookings. He passes over the first very quickly, but you should think about it since (as he hints here) it will become very important later. He begins to discuss the second way of explaining these lookings in the third paragraph of §22 but he lays it out most explicitly in the displayed text of §23. Of course, you should think through his criticisms of this sort of explanation.