These sections not only develop Sellars's analysis of the Myth of the Given further but begin to indicate his alternative account of perceptual knowledge.

• The key material for us in §§8-9 is the distinction between codes and theories found in §8 and the second §9 (section numbers are repeated at a couple points in the book). This is related to criticisms of the logical positivists' understanding of scientific theories that were becoming well known at the time Sellars wrote this paper. The relevant views of the positivists appear in Blumberg and Feigl's mention of the views of Reichenbach and Bridgman concerning the empirical content of theories in §III, p. 289, and the discussion of meaning and verification in §IV, p. 293. (The triple bar in the second §9 is a somewhat old-fashioned symbolic notation for "if and only if," and the dots surrounding it can serve as punctuation to indicate relative scope thought they are not needed for that here.)

• In §10, notice that Sellars distinguishes acceptance of Myth of Given from the acceptance of inner episodes and sets out to consider examples of the former that don't involve the latter.

• This leads him to discuss the relation of "X looks red to S at t" to "X is red" (§§11-12). As will become clear in the following sections, Sellars considers the latter idea to be in some sense prior to or more fundamental than the former; but then, he must account for the equivalence

x is red if and only if x would look red to standard observers in standard conditions

(which is expressed in the display of §12 using some old symbolic notation for "if and only if").

• The heart of Sellars's discussion of "looks"--and the heart of this part of the monograph--is the fable of John, the necktie salesman, §§14-15, so be sure to think about it, its moral, and its implications.