This part of Kripke's final lecture turns to a quite different topic, the mind-body problem. It appears at all only because Kripke wishes to argue that a point he made concerning theoretical identifications does not apply to identifications of pains, for example, with neuro-physiological states or processes.

• Kripke first introduces the issue and notes its historical connection to Descartes (pp. 144f).

• He then notes the problem his account of theoretical identifications poses for proponents of the identity of pains and brain states, speaking initially of particular pains and particular brain states (pp. 146-148).

• Next he formulates the issue as it applies to the identification of types of mental states with types of brain states and suggests a reply that might be attempted (pp. 148-150).

• The final and most important part of this discussion is his consideration of this reply (pp. 150-155). Since the reply follows the lines of things he has said about theoretical identifications in other cases, he must say what is special about this case. He finds the special features in the relation of pain (and other mental states) to the idea of qualitatively identical epistemic situations. Think about the significance of his claims here in relation to other things we've read. In particular, do you think Sellars would see them as an example of the Myth of the Given? (See, for example, Kripke's talk of "immediate phenomenological quality," p. 152; but see also footnote 77, p. 155, to get a balanced sense of his views on the mind-body problem.)