The main topic of in this part of the lectures is an account of identities between proper names--the second problem for a theory of proper names that Kripke had stated in lecture I (pp. 28f). Kripke will also (in the assignment for Wednesday) consider a similar question about general terms. He introduces this question (along with an issue he will discuss in the assignment for Friday) on pp. 97-100.

Kripke's discussion of identity between names (pp. 100-110) involves him in a defense of the idea that there can be necessary truths that are not known a priori. The basic idea in this defense appears first at the top of p. 102 and is restated in important ways also on p. 104 (notice the idea of qualitatively indistinguishable evidence) and p. 108 (notice the conditional which Kripke says is known a priori).