Reading guide for Wed 2/9 and Fri 2/11: Blumberg and Feigl, "Logical Positivism," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 28 (1931), pp. 281-296
(not in Lilly but you can find it on JSTOR)
 

The article reports the views of the logical positivists but only suggests the arguments for these views. Nevertheless, you should look for points that you disagree with and formulate your own arguments against them. We will discuss sections I and II (pp. 281-288) on Wed and sections III and IV (pp. 288-296) on Fri. (JSTOR p. 281 and JSTOR p. 288.)

• In section I, pay special attention to the discussion of Wittgenstein's views about logic, but watch also for the talk of "verification" that begins to appear at the end; that will be important in the last section. (The quotation from Hahn, p. 284, might be translated as "An omniscient subject makes no use of logic and, in opposition to Plato, we can say: God never practices mathematics.")

• Section II, pp. 285-288, begins with a reference to Russell. You should think about the connections not only with what he says in chs. 4 and 5 of The Problems of Philosophy but also with what he says about the nature of matter in chapter 3.

• In section III, pp. 288-292, the focus is on the philosophical problems concerning the nature of geometry that were raised by relativity theory. This is an important topic in its own right and an important point of disagreement between the logical positivists and Kant, but the closest connections with what you've read in Russell come in the brief remarks on probability and causality at the end.

• The last section, pp. 292-296, provides the clearest indication of the logical positivists' positivism. The range of topics is comparable to Russell's chs. 14 and 15. Notice especially the use of the idea of verification. The idea that "the meaning of propositions is identical with the conditions of the their verification" (p. 293) is probably the most important doctrine of the movement. Compare the view of philosophy that this leads to with Russell's view of the nature of philosophy; but think about the logical positivists' view also in its own right. Although we will see a broader conception of meaning in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the view of philosophy that Wittgenstein offers along with it is, if anything, further removed from the traditional conception.