In his introductory comments (pp. 1-3), Kripke describes his preface as a partial substitute for an expanded revision of the lectures and suggests that it be read after a first reading of the book. We are departing from that order slightly because the preface addresses none of the issues raised in the final part of the lectures that we will consider for the rest of this week. (Indeed, the preface concerns mainly ideas from the first lecture.)
After these introductory remarks, the preface can be divided into four unequal parts.
• First (pp. 3-5), Kripke sketches the development of his thinking that led to the ideas in the lectures.
• His second, and main, topic is the idea that proper names are rigid designators (pp. 6-15). Between an introductory exposition (pp. 6-7) and concluding remarks suggesting why Russell had taken a different view of names (pp. 14-15), Kripke discusses what he takes to be two misconceptions, one concerning the possibility of more than one person sharing a name (pp. 7-10) and the other concerning the relation of rigid designation to scope distinctions (pp. 10-14).
• Kripke then turns to a shorter discussion of the concept of possible worlds (pp. 15-20). He seems concerned partly to emphasize points he made in the first lecture (pp. 42-47), but I suspect he also wished locate his views among the various ways of understanding the idea that had been advanced in the previous couple of decades.
• Kripke’s final topic is a point concerning proper names that he had not made explicit in his lectures. Although he gives this only a single paragraph (pp. 20-21), his remarks suggest that he takes the issue to be important (and the essay he mentions in footnote 21 has been widely discussed).