The last part of Kripke’s lectures turns to a quite different topic, the mind-body problem. This topic is addressed at all only because Kripke wishes to argue that a point he made concerning theoretical identifications does not apply to identifications of pains, for example, with neuro-physiological states or processes.
• Kripke first introduces the issue and notes its historical connection to Descartes (pp. 144f).
• He then notes the problem his account of theoretical identifications poses for proponents of the identity of pains and brain states, speaking initially of particular pains and particular brain states (pp. 146-148).
• Next he formulates the issue as it applies to the identification of types of mental states with types of brain states and suggests a reply that might be attempted (pp. 148-150). (In the rest of the lecture, which we will discuss next time, he will respond to this line of argument.)