In this relatively short section of Lecture II, Kripke presents his own theory (or, as he says, “picture”) of how proper names refer.
• Kripke’s picture is most directly an answer to the first of the three problems that the description theory seemed well suited to deal with (see pp. 27-29). He presents the picture with this in mind on p. 91 and summarizes it again on p. 96. The picture soon came to be referred to as a “causal (or causal-historical) theory of reference.” Setting aside the question of whether Kripke has provided a theory, do you think that label is appropriate? And, of course, ask yourself whether Kripke’s picture really solves the first of the three problems.
• Kripke also says in passing here as much as he does anywhere in these lectures about the third of the problems from pp. 27-29 (see the discussions of “Santa Claus” and “Napoleon” on pp. 93, 96f and the further comments in the Addenda on p. 163).
• Kripke avoids committing himself to many details of his picture, but he does address some subtleties in his discussions of the quotation from Strawson (which appears on p. 90 just before this assignment begins) and of the contrasting examples of “Newton” and “George Smith” (pp. 95f).