Phi 346-02 Sp13
 
Reading guide for Wed. 3/13: Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 22-34
 
 

Kripke’s Naming and Necessity is an edited transcription of three lectures. Topically also, it can be divided into three parts: (i) an introductory discussion of a number of concepts, (ii) Kripke’s criticisms of, and his own alternative to, a common theory of proper names, and (iii) the consequences of his view of proper names for a number of issues, most of which are tied in some way to equality or identity. The two divisions into three don’t quite coincide, with each of (ii) and (iii) beginning a few pages before the respective lecture. I’ve followed the division of topics in my assignments, which will form three groups (consisting of 4, 3, and 6 classes, respectively, followed by a final class focusing on the book’s preface).

The first lecture is introductory and addresses a number of topics. Kripke first lays out the basic issue concerning the semantics of proper names that will be at the center of the whole book, and that discussion is your first assignment.

First note Kripke’s stipulation of the terminology (proper) name, (definite) description, and designator (p. 24). (Even before this, Kripke mentions his views on the term unicorn; he doesn’t return to them in the main text but he does in the first of the Addenda at the end, pp. 156-158.)

Donnellan’s example (p. 25) and Kripke’s extension of it to names (in note 3) point to an important distinction analogous to the distinction between implication and implicature that some of you have encountered in Phi 270. Kripke developed this distinction elsewhere but it plays little role in these lectures.

The central topic of Naming and Necessity is the choice between the two views of proper names that Kripke attributes to Mill on the one hand and Frege and Russell on the other. He describes the difference initially on pp. 26-27. Before going on, think about which you favor; Kripke will support Mill.

Kripke mentions a series of three arguments for the Frege-Russell view (one in each paragraph on pp. 27-29). Each amounts to a puzzle about names for which the Frege-Russell views offers a solution. Once Kripke has argued against the Frege-Russell view, he will take on the task of solving (some of) these puzzles from his point of view.

The specific form of the Frege-Russell view, Kripke will eventually argue against is the “cluster concept” theory he motivates and introduces on pp. 30-31.

Kripke finishes framing the issue concerning proper names that he will discuss by making a distinction between giving meaning and determining (or fixing) reference (pp. 32-33).