Freeman is concerned to distinguish appeals to popularity from arguments ad populum in general. Although it is not just Copi (who he cites) that describes the argumentum ad populum in the broad way that concerns Freeman (see, for example, Watts in Hansen and Pinto, p. 59), I'd be inclined to claim that many of the other things that description appears to include are not sufficiently like arguments to warrant discussion as fallacies. I suspect that what Freeman is interested in is the real core of what people have in mind when they speak of ad populum. Freeman discusses two aspects of the sort of fallacy, each of which raises broader questions.

The first, which he addresses fairly quickly on pp. 266ff, is what force needs to be ascribed to an argument for it to be counted as a fallacy of this sort. Does popularity need to be presented as conclusive grounds for acceptance or can it be fallacious even if it is assigned some lesser weight? An analogous question can be asked about many other fallacies. If the problem with a possible fallacy is that it is not a strong argument, can it escape the charge of fallaciousness if it is not presented as conclusive? If not, what sort of strength must be ascribed to its use for that use to be fallacious?

The second issue occupies his attention for the rest of the paper. Popular acceptance of a claim has sometimes been held to be grounds for a presumption in its favor. Doing so gives the claim a real advantage in argument, so is an argumentum ad populum in the relevant sense? The broader question this raises is the nature of grounds for a presumption. It would at least seem strange to cite such grounds as premises because that would present a presumption as requiring an argument on its behalf--but, if these grounds are not premises, what is their role?