Phi 272 Fall 2013 |
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Teller’s discussion provides one way of understanding the discomfort Bell’s theorem might produce. Not everyone is a “physicalist” in the broad sense Teller sketches at the beginning, but his arguments can be motivated by physicalism concerning narrower ranges of phenomena.
• Teller’s first two numbered sections (pp. 71-73) are introductory, leading up to the notion of “relational holism” and the associated idea of “inherent relations” that are his main topic. Key ideas leading up to this are the notions of “supervenience” (which is explained in the first paragraph)—together with the distinction between “local” and “global” varieties of it—and of “local physicalism.”
• The third section (pp. 74-76) discusses relational holism in the context of non-quantum physics (including general relativity). If you are not fluent in talk of classical mechanics, it might help to know that when he says that “a differential equation relates rate of change of potential energy in space to rate of change of velocity in time,” he has in mind a version of Newton’s f = ma. (Of course, a is the rate of change of velocity in time; and the force f in a given direction is the negative of the rate with which potential energy changes in that direction.) Also, notice the significance of the issue of space-time substantivalism, in the sense discussed by Norton, for Teller’s topic (see p. 75): the “space-time points” Teller speaks of are the points making up the manifold M that Norton spoke of.
• In the remainder of the article, Teller addresses quantum mechanics. The “eigenstates” he speaks of are connected to the projection postulate that was Margenau’s concern: according to that postulate, measurement puts the system into an eigenstate for the value produced by the measurement. And “superposition” is what leads to probabilities that can violate the inequality Bell derived for systems with “instruction sets” (in Mermin’s terms—see his p. 44).