| Phi 272 Fall 2013 |
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Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) wrote this about 100 years ago, but he is part of a British tradition of empiricism—the view that our knowledge should be traced back to sense experience—that goes back several centuries, to Francis Bacon and beyond.
In what he says here, Russell has in mind especially the views of David Hume (1711-1776), but Russell will also offer criticisms of Hume that are characteristic of the forms empiricism took in the 20th century. At the time he wrote this, Russell was also working on logic and the foundations of mathematics, and what he says here about induction points to the idea of an “inductive logic.” This sort of idea was developed further by a movement, which began a decade later, that is usually called “logical positivism.” (The term positivism is used in this context to point to a very strong form of empiricism and “logical empiricism” is an alternative label for the movement.)
Here are some things to note or think about as you read Russell:
• His initial discussion of induction (¶¶6.1-6.14—i.e., paragraphs 1-14 of ch. 6) recalls arguments made by Hume. But the distinction Russell makes between causes of beliefs and reasons for them (¶¶6.6-6.8) points to a criticism of a view that Hume held—namely, that our past experience influences our expectations of the future not by reasoning but by habit.
• Russell’s own solution to the problem raised by Hume’s arguments lies in part in the principles stated in ¶¶6.15 and 6.16; think about the differences between the two principles and between the two parts of each of them. The remainder of his solution lies in what he says about the grounds for our belief in these principles; he begins to discuss that in ¶¶6.18-6.20. He continues to develop his views in succeeding chapters of his book; if you are curious about what he says there, you can find an on-line version of the book on the Canvas site for the course.
• Ch. 6 concludes with an argument for the importance of our knowledge of general principles. The description “knowledge which, on a basis of experience tells us something about what is not experienced” (¶6.20) must, for Russell, apply to all our empirical knowledge of the external world since he had argued earlier in his book that we have direct experience only of the contents and operations of our minds.