As Kitcher will make clear, the concept of a species is a traditional problem not only for philosophers of biology but for biologists themselves. In the first assignment, Kitcher will look critically at two sorts of approach to the concept; and, in the second, he will outline his own view.

Assignment for Mon. 12/9: §§1-3 (pp. 308-319)

Following the introductory §1, the Kitcher’s sections 2 and 3 each focus on one approach to characterizing species. The first addresses the idea that a species is an individual with particular organisms as parts. In the course of Kitcher’s discussion in this section, you will find comments on the existence of laws in biology that are somewhat different from Rosenberg’s (which is not a surprise since Kitcher is one of the anti-reductionists that Rosenberg criticized). The second section looks primarily at one way of characterizing a species as the set of organisms. A phrase Kitcher often uses when speaking of this view—“the biological species concept”—is in fact widely used as a name for the idea. Since Kitcher himself thinks that species are sets, what he criticizes about this concept is the claim that it is the only legitimate concept of species. This point is summarized in the last paragraph of the section, and it is the reason he uses the term “monism” in the section’s title.

Assignment for Wed. 12/11: §§4-5 (pp. 320-331)

In §4, Kitcher argues for his own “pluralism” with regard to the concept of species. More specifically he points to a variety of concepts, which are summarized in the figure on p. 325. Of the three morals that Kitcher draws in §5, it is the latter two (which he discusses on pp. 330-331) that are most important for our purposes.