• What grounds does Kuhn give for saying that we take progress as a criterion for considering a discipline to be a science (pp. 160-162 [159-161])?

• Why is the activity of normal science bound to appear as progress (pp. 162-163 [161-162])?

• What features of normal science will tend to lead to progress?—and progress of what sort (pp. 163-166 [162-165])?

• What common characteristics does Kuhn find in scientific communities (pp. 166-169 [165-168])?

• Why will a change of paradigms seem to be progress?—and in what respects will it really be progress (pp. 169-170 [168-169])?

• In what ways does Kuhn compare scientific progress to Darwinian evolution (pp. 170-173 [169-172])?

• In what respects is Kuhn willing to grant that his view of science is a kind of relativism (p. 205 [pp. 203-204])?

• What grounds does he give for holding that it is not mere relativism (pp. 205-207 [204-205])?

• In what way does Kuhn say he has used descriptions of what science is as evidence for what it ought to be (pp. 207-208 [206-207])?

• In what ways does Kuhn grant that the history of science is similar to the history of other disciplines (pp. 208-209 [p. 207])?

• What does Kuhn cite as distinguishing features of science (pp. 209-210 [207-208])?