In this paper Salmon surveys views of explanation that developed after Hempel’s account was published. I’ve assigned the first section of the paper and most (all but the last page) of the second. In the part of the paper we will discuss, Salmon looks at extensions of the D-N model along with some criticisms of it. Nearly all of these focus on explanation using statistical laws—i.e., laws which are not absolute generalizations of the form All As are Bs but instead statistical claims asserting that some percentage of As are Bs.
• The main focus of section 1 (pp. 241-248) is an account of statistical explanation offered by Hempel. The most important ideas are the form of “inductive-statistical” explanations, the “problem of ambiguity” facing such explanations, and the “requirement of maximum specificity” designed to handle this problem. (You may well find the statement of the last of these difficult: it’s enough to understand the examples that follow its statement on pp. 245-246.)
• The second section begins with four problematic examples most of which will also figure in the paper by van Fraassen that we will discuss on Wed. and Fri. The rest of the portion of this section that we will discuss (through p. 253) addresses two topics. At its beginning and end (pp. 250-251, 253), it has an account of Salmon’s own views on explanation and, in between (pp. 251-252), a sketch of a different line of criticism of Hempel. This last topic is less important for our purposes and will probably get little attention in our discussion.
If you have time, you might go on to read the rest of the paper (pp. 254-260). In it, Salmon will sketch quite a number of different views very quickly, probably too quickly to give much of a sense of their content, but van Fraassen will say more about some of these in his paper.