The first part of Rosenberg’s paper (i.e., §§1-3) is primarily critical of the application to biology of traditional views of theoretical reduction and is also critical of arguments against reduction. In the second part, Rosenberg sets out his views, which turn out to be a form of reductionism that he takes to be suited to biology. His discussion throughout turns on the interplay between evolutionary theory and molecular biology that he takes to be central to the character of contemporary biology.

Assignment for Mon. 11/28: §§1-2 (pp. 135-142)

After a brief introduction, Rosenberg presents a critical discussion of reduction in §2. Note especially the specific problems Rosenberg sees biology as posing for reductionism in its traditional form. In discussing this, Rosenberg uses (and extends) some terminology for parts of an explanation that you’ve seen already in Hempel: the explanandum (for which he also uses the plural explananda) is what is explained and the explanans (pl. explanatia) is what does the explaining. Laws ceteris paribus are laws “other things being equal,” or, roughly, laws that hold in normal cases. (The expression “(x)[Fx → Gx]” in footnote 4 could be read “for all x, if x is an F then x is a G.”)

Assignment for Wed. 11/30: §§3-4 (pp. 142-149)

In this part of the paper, Rosenberg completes his critical discussion and begins laying the groundwork for his positive account of reduction in biology. In his discussion of anti-reductionism in §3, he mentions some alternative views of explanation. The “unification” account is Kitcher’s; you’ve seen brief discussions of this sort of view also in Salmon and van Fraassen (KHR 258f and 267f—look for references to Friedman and Kitcher). One example of the “causal” account is Salmon’s later view (see KHR 253), and van Fraassen’s pragmatic view of explanation is an example of an “erotetic” account (the label means ‘concerned with questions’). (The sign ∨ appearing on pp. 145f stands for ‘or’, so a list of terms joined by the sign is a list of alternatives.) Although §4 is shorter, it may be the key section of the paper since it presents Rosenberg’s reasons for describing biology as historical.

Assignment for Fri. 12/2: §§5-6 (pp. 150-163)

For Friday, think about the sort of reductionism Rosenberg proposes in §5 and how others might respond to it. The best route into this may be to focus on the ideas of “how-possibly” and “why-necessary” explanations (see pp. 151-152), the examples of them that Rosenberg finds in biology, and the relation between them he suggests (see especially pp. 153-154). In the final, shorter §6, Rosenberg has a few more things to say about anti-reductionism.