Phi 272 F11

Reading guide for Wed. 11/16 and Fri. 11/18: Norton, “Causation as Folk Science,” §§1-3, 4-7 (pp. 1-12, 12-22)—in Philosophers’ Imprint vol. 3 (2003), no. 4, at http://www.philosophersimprint.org/
 

Both Eddington and Margenau dealt with issues raised by specific physical theories, but Norton’s concern is broader. Indeed, this paper could have fit as well into the first part of the course. I have placed it among material on the philosophy of physics partly because Norton’s examples come almost exclusively from physics and because the issue of causation tends to arise there most clearly.

In his introduction, Norton says he says both a negative and a positive thesis, and he divides his paper almost evenly between the two. We will divide our two discussions in the same way.

Assignment for Wed. 11/16: §§1-3 (pp. 1-12)

After the introductory §1, we will focus on §2, where Norton not only sets out his negative thesis but also surveys are variety of positions on causation. Most of the section is organized around the two horns of a dilemma he poses for the position on causation that he calls “fundamentalism.”

Although §3 makes up a substantial part of the text in this assignment (and helps to secure this paper as one on the philosophy of physics), it really only provides an example that fills out one point made in §2, that there are limits on determinism even in Newtonian physics (see. p. 5).

Assignment for Fri. 11/18: §§4-7 (pp. 12-22)

§4 sets out Norton’s positive thesis regarding causation, and the stance on reduction he takes in developing it is of interest in its own right. You have read Kuhn’s discussion of the sort of reduction of superseded theories to current ones that Norton has in mind, so you should think how their views compare.

Before a brief conclusion in §7, Norton sketches the content of the “folk science” of causation in §5 and offers of couple examples of its application in §6. You have run into the issue of final causes in Hempel (his §4, KHR 211-217); Norton suggest that his own view of ordinary “efficient” causation provides a way rehabilitating final causes in the face of the sort of criticism people like Hempel have offered. He makes the point first in (g) of §5 but develops it further in his discussion of the second example of §6.