Carl Hempel (1905-1997) was one of the best-known philosophers of science in the latter half of the 20th century, and his account of explanation is one of the things for which he is best known. We will be spending two days on it, but not consecutively. Section 3 (KHR, 211-217; JSTOR, §4, 140-146) discusses explanation outside the physical sciences and raises issues that are easiest to deal with on their own, so we will discuss that section separately (on Friday). Before turning to it, we will read (for Wed.) a different selection in KHR concerning topics closely related to the parts of Hempel’s paper that are in this first assignment.

The account of explanation that Hempel describes is commonly referred to as the “deductive-nomological” or “D-N” model of explanation. That label reflects the fact that it accounts for explanation in terms of deduction and laws (nomological means something like ‘relating to laws’). The key thing you need to do in reading the introduction and §§1-2 (JSTOR §§1-3) is to see how Hempel does try to account for explanation on those terms (and, of course, whether you think he succeeds).

The other portion of the paper we will discuss Mon., §4 (JSTOR §6), concerns the idea of a law. Hempel will begin with the idea of a generalization and attempt to add just the right further requirements to capture laws in the sense required for his account of explanation. You should follow his efforts and consider whether he succeeds. We will be considering the problem of characterizing laws again on Wed.

(You might take some things Hempel says about the common use of the term ‘law’ with a grain of salt. For example, what he refers to as “Bode’s general formula” is in fact commonly referred to as “Bode’s law” or “the Titius-Bode law” even though it is not commonly believed to be true and perhaps not even “law-like” in the sense Hempel discusses. Incidentally, it’s worth looking up Bode’s law on line; it will be good example to think about in connection with Wednesday’s assignment, too.)