Reading guide for Tues. 9/1: Okasha, ch. 1; Thagard, “Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience” (on JSTOR).


Okasha introduces the philosophy of science by way of a brief history of science since the Copernicus. We won’t do much with this material in class, but it will be useful to have this historical framework in mind as the course goes on—even before we directly address issued raised by the history of science.

When Okasha turns to philosophy of science itself, he does so by considering the question of how to define science and, in particular, how to distinguish it from activities that can appear or pretend to be science but are not. Although it does not occupy a large part of Okasha’s first chapter, this issue is also the topic of Thagard’s paper and it will be the main focus of our class discussion.

•  Okasha concentrates on the demarcation of science offered by Karl Popper. You should get a sense of what Popper’s view is, how it might be criticized, and what you take to be the relative strength of the arguments on each side.

•  Thagard discusses Popper’s view, too, but he also discusses other alternatives, including his own view. His descriptions of some alternatives are a little sketchy, and many of the alternatives have fuzzy boundaries, so don’t worry if you find it hard to sort them all out. You should at least think about what Thagard says about Popper and also think about Thagard’s own view. In particular, how might Thagard’s approach be criticized?

•  Also try to formulate your own view on the question of what distinguishes science from non-science. That might be a matter of choosing one of the views you have seen described and thinking how you’d argue for it, but you might have ideas that don’t match any of the alternatives mentioned by Okasha or Thagard.

One final note. Thagard writes for an audience that is familiar with some things that you aren’t (yet) familiar with. Don’t worry if you don’t know all the things he seems to think his reader knows. First of all, he says enough about the works he refers to for our purposes. But also, even people who have read everything he refers to might have understood these works differently than he does and would have to depend on what he says about these works in order to know for sure how he understands them.