Your exam will consist of a number of short and medium length essays questions, all of which can be answered of an understanding of the topics listed below. So, to prepare for the exam, you should freshen your understanding of each of the concepts, distinctions, and groups of related concepts in list. In particular:
• For each item, be able to supply (as appropriate) a short explanation of a concept or account of a distinction or opposition between between a pair of concepts. Be ready to offer examples in such explanations.
• Don’t look at the separate topics only in isolation. Think about connections among them and be ready to answer questions that ask you to explore such connections.
Some questions may ask you simply to explain an idea and perhaps offer examples; others will ask you about the relations among two or more ideas, perhaps ideas presented by different philosophers. You can expect some freedom of choice in the questions you answer but not enough to enable you to safely ignore more than a few items on this list.
The topics appear below in the order we ready the people named, and there is roughly one topic per class meeting. In formulating this list, I have chosen terms or phrases that are prominent in the text, but some are more prominent than others. The reading guides can be helpful in locating material about these topics; but, if you have any doubt about what I have in mind or where discussions of these ideas appear, I’ll be happy to supply more information.
Topics
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Place: phenomenological fallacy Armstrong: causal analysis of mental concepts Haugeland: semantic engines original intentionality Putnam: functional state Block: homunculi-headed robot and liberalism Davidson (“Mental Events”): anomalous monism Churchland: eliminative materialism Carruthers: introspective thesis Mentalese Churchland and Sejnowski: theory dualism connectionist vs. sentence-logic models of the mind Fodor and Pylyshyn: systematicity Brooks: decomposition by activity vs. decomposition by function |
Skinner: radical vs. methodological behaviorism Dennett: physical, design, and intentional stances intentional system realism vs. irrealism (or instrumentalism) about patterns and about belief Gordon: simulation and prediction Stich and Nichols: theory-theory vs. simulationism Davidson (“Knowing One’s Own Mind”): wide vs. narrow states (or content) Clark and Chalmers: active externalism Jackson: knowledge argument van Gulick: explanatory gap argument Lycan: higher-order representation theories of consciousness Chalmers: verification vs. satisfaction Solomon: emotions vs. feelings Prinz: James-Lange theory |