In his first footnote, Smart describes this paper as a revision and defense of Place's ideas that is also related to Fiegl's views, so you can think of this as a basis for continuing and developing your thinking about their ideas.

After presenting an argument against dualism, Smart considers two alternatives to that view, something like the position he ascribes to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and his own view (he states the latter on p. 62 c.1). After a one-paragraph discussion of identity on p. 62, Smart turns to replies to various objections to his view. As you read the objections, decide which you think is the most difficult for him to respond to (he has something to say about this but you may see things differently). Also think which are the most important objections (that's a related question but your answer might be different). We'll probably spend the bulk of the class talking about a few of these objections; we're unlikely to cover all of them.

Vocabulary should be less of a problem in Smart than in Feigl, but there is still some that may be new to you:

• The label "Occam's razor" (p. 61 c. 1) is applied to injunctions along the lines of "Do not assume the existence of more entities than is absolutely necessary." Ask yourself why Smart takes this to provide an argument against dualism.
• The idea of "nomological danglers" (p. 61 c.1) is related to epiphenomenalism. The term nomological refers to laws, in this case the causal laws that are supposed to tie mental events (as effects) to physical events (as their causes). Smart's reference is to a passage in Feigl's paper than comes before the one you read. Smart himself discusses epiphenomenalism explicitly in his concluding comments (p. 67).
• Sense data (see the presentation of objection 3, p. 63) are appearances, or the contents of sensation. When I look at an object, I see the object; but the content of my visual sensation of it might be said to consist of various patches of color. If this is right, those patches are my sense data of the object. This is related to Descartes's claim to "certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed" (p. 12, middle of c. 1) even if he is really dreaming. That is, he might be said to certainly have sense data even if no external object causes them. U. T. Place used the terms phenomenal and phenomenological to speak of similar ideas.