This paper compares functionalism--the approach to the mind-body problem Putnam referred to in footnote 3 of "Brains and Behavior" (Chalmers, p. 54)--to something like Smart's form of mind-brain identity and to logical behaviorism.
§I. Putnam's distinction between property and concept is intended to accomplish the same work as Smart's distinction between contingent identity (i. e., cases where A "happens to be" B) and cases where translation is possible. To see the connection, compare Smart's example that lightning is an electrical discharge with Putnam's examples (such as "temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy," p. 74 c. 1).
§II. Putnam here describes his alternative to the view that pains are brain states. You might think of the "machine table" he talks about as having the form shown in the example below. It has 9 cells, each containing two lists of probabilities. The cell specifying the machine's behavior at a given moment is determined by the machine's current state (the rows) and its sensory input (the columns). The list of probabilities then indicate, for each of a number of possible next states, the chance that the machine will enter that state next and, for each of a number of possible actions, the chance that the machine will now perform that action.
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| sensory input | ||||||
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| red | green | blue | ||||
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current state | state 1 | prob's of states | prob's of actions | prob's of states | prob's of actions | prob's of states | prob's of actions |
| state 2 | prob's of states | prob's of actions | prob's of states | prob's of actions | prob's of states | prob's of actions | |
| state 3 | prob's of states | prob's of actions | prob's of states | prob's of actions | prob's of states | prob's of actions | |
A "Description" simply states that the system has a certain table. Putnam emphasizes that we know about the states only their function as described by the table; we do not know what they are "really". That's why they are "functional states".
§III. Pay especial attention to the arguments in this section; they are the heart of the paper for our purposes. Putnam offers essentially one argument against the brain state hypothesis and one in favor of his own--what are they?
§IV. The second paragraph of this section returns to considerations Putnam discussed in "Brains and Behavior." The short last paragraph of the section is more important for his argument than its length might indicate.
§V. Putam argues here basically that functionalism has the same value as reductions like "temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy" have in the physical sciences. Do you think the case of mental states is or should be parallel?