Reading guide for 9/30: Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat? (Chalmers, pp. 219-226)
There are no section breaks in this paper but there are four rough divisions in content, and the notes below are divided accordingly.
Introduction (p. 219 to p. 220 col. 1). Here Nagel gives a first statement of his main point and of its significance for views of the relation between mind and body. One question you should begin to think about here is how his views fit with the various accounts of the relation between mind and body that we have considered already. In particular, think how Place might respond to Nagel's comments at the very end of this part (in the first full paragraph of p. 220).
"Let me first try to state ..." (p. 220 col. 1 to p. 222 col. 1). The heart of this part is an example by which Nagel explains his distinction between the subjective and objective, but there is also an important clarification in the last paragraph (beginning at the end of p. 221). (The phrases "pour-soi" and "en-soi" mean 'for-itself' and 'in-itself' and have roughly the force of "subjective" and "objective," respectively.)
"This bears directly ..." (p. 222 col. 1 to p. 223, col. 2). The key thing to understand here is the difference Nagel sees between a reductive account of lightning and an attempt to give a reductive account of experience.
"What moral should be ..." (p. 223 col. 1 to p. 225). Nagel's conclusion explains his attitude to physicalism (the view that all states and events are physical). He states his position in the first paragraph of this part and goes on to elaborate it. Notice the discussion of an "objective phenomenology" in the last three paragraphs. What is its value from Nagel's point of view? Do you think it is likely to be feasible?