While Dennett offers reasons why we might wish to use explanations in terms of beliefs and desires, Churchland suggests reasons why we might stop using what he refers to as "folk psychology" or "FP": folk psychology is a theory, indeed a rather superficial one, and it may be replaced by a better one.

I. Here Churchland sets the context for his argument. The notation he uses for the displayed laws can be read as follows: "(x)" amounts to 'for all x' and other parenthesized letters can be read similarly, the horseshoe symbol ⊃ can be read 'implies', and "~ p" can be read 'p is false'. In general, the letter 'p' will stand for what Chisholm referred to as a "propositional clause."

II. This is a catalog of the limitations of folk psychology. Which seems to you the most serious?

III. Although Churchland cites Dennett in connection with the first argument he considers here, he doesn't have in mind the sort of argument presented in the selection by Dennett that you have read. Dennett's idea of the intentional strategy is closer to the second argument Churchland discusses.

IV. This section has Churchland's replies to the arguments of the last. The example of alchemy is intended as a reply to the second argument in III and the reply to the first is at the end of the section. How do you think supporters of folk psychology and functionalism might respond to each reply?

V. At the heart of this section are three speculative stories about the future of cognitive science. Churchland doesn't offer them as predictions; but, for elimination of folk psychology to occur, something along these lines must take place. Do you think any of these is a viable alternative to current ways of thinking about mental activity?