This is another response to the arguments you've seen for qualia and consciousness. Churchland both presents arguments and responds to them so his discussion is in a way analogous in form to Smart's. The difference is that the arguments Churchland considers here are mostly parodies. They have the same forms as arguments for consciousness and qualia, but they are stated as arguments for the irreducibility of light. Churchland assumes that the reducibility of light to electormagnetic radiation will be granted by all (notice that he is speaking of light, not visual qualia), so he thinks that all will grant that these parodies have false conclusions and will be ready to spot their flaws.

The arguments are presented in three groups, in sections I, II, and IV, with those in sections I and II discussed in III (the argument presented in section IV is discussed there, too). Section V offers some general considerations about the nature of qualia.

Churchland associates all these arguments with John Searle but he associates those in sections II and IV also with Jackson and Nagel, respectively. Of those in section I, the argument parodied in (C), commonly known as the "Chinese room argument," is the most important. There is a presentation of it in the paper by Searle that is the last selection in the Chalmers anthology (see the first two full paragraphs of p. 671).

There are too many arguments for us to discuss all of them. The Searle's argument about the Chinese room (and Churchland's parody) should be one we discuss, so please treat Searle's presentation of it as part of your assignemnt. Beyond that, pick the argument where you take Churchland to raise the most important issues and we'll try to discuss at least a couple of your choices in class.

Section V probably does the most to make clear Churchland's special perspective on qualia and consciousness. Think about what he has to say there and, in particular, compare it to what Lewis says.