Ayer supports a sort of position human freedom that is sometimes called "compatibilism." That is, he argues that human freedom is compatible with the claim that all our actions are causally determined.

This paper divides almost evenly into two parts. The first explores the difficulties the result from the assumption that freedom and causality are incompatible. Ayer then states his own view (p. 664, col. 2) and goes on to explain it and defend it against objections.

Another common position on this issue reconciles freedom and causation by associating them with different perspectives on people and their actions. Immanuel Kant is the historical source of this approach, but views that are in various ways similar to, or influenced by, his can be found frequently in more recent work. Dennett's idea of different "stances" and, in particular, his view of the relation between the intentional and physical stances provides one example. The similarity of his discussion to Kant is heightened when Dennett is seen as offering an argument for folk psychology based on its "normative character" (to use Churchland's phrase--Chalmers, 573), for, according to Kant, it is part of respecting ourselves and others as moral agents to ascribe freedom. Another, well-known recent discussion of related issues is Donald Davidson's "Mental Events" (Chalmers, 116-125), which, while not focused directly on the issue of freedom, begins and ends with quotations from Kant's discussion and makes references to the issue throughout.